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FOREWORD 
The authors of this work argue by means of Fourth Epoch War theory that the intro-
duction of nonlethal technology on the battlefield will be as significant as the introduction 
of gunpowder during the European Renaissance. If these authors are accurate in this 
projection, it will mean that the Army, within the context afForce XXI, will be required 
to cope with both an entirely new concept of politico-military force and the emerging 
ethical debate which will surround its development. 
Recent events appear to support this contention. Disclosures concerning the Iraqi 
biological program confirm agents were being specifically developed to seriously inca-
pacitate opposing troops, rather than kill them, in order to place a greater logistical strain 
on Western forces. Closer to home, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry has announced 
that the Department of Defense prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause 
permanent blindness of unenhanced vision. This has resulted in the Army's being or-
dered to discontinue its AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasures System program whose 
M-16 rifle-mounted laser weapon is designed to be used against the optical sights of 
enemy armored vehicles, which may incidentally have such blinding effects. 
Because this Land Warfare Paper raises many important implications and fundamen-
tal questions concerning nonlethal technology and its relationship to Force XXI, we offer 
it as a vehicle toward new avenues of professional military debate. 
February 1996 
I ~?f).~ 
JACK N. MERRITT 
General, U.S. Army Retired 
President 
Nonlethal Technology and Fourth Epoch War: 
A New Paradigm of Politico-Military Force 
Introduction 
How politico-military force will be employed in future war is of major concern to 
U.S. national security and, because of its operational leadership in this area, to the Army's 
Force XXI campaign plan. It is envisioned that such force will qualitatively change 
because of the introduction of advanced technology. This technology will extend the 
West's continuing mastery of the application of political violence. No longer in war will 
the West have the capability solely to kill; now, like a martial arts master, it will be able to 
rely upon nonlethal means to disarm an opponent. 1 As a result, an effective national 
policy to deal with the appropriate employment of technologically advanced politico-
military force will become a challenge of the first magnitude. How our policy makes use 
of this new method of waging war has far-reaching and potentially dangerous national 
security implications. 
Until recently, nonlethal technologies have existed in "black" (i.e., classified) pro-
grams with little information being made public. 2 With more information being released 
as funding for a number of these programs becomes imminent, their potential impact is 
becoming apparent.3 The vast potential that nonlethal technologies provide has already 
been recognized by visionary military scholars. Col. John A. Warden III, USAF, in a 
recent briefing concerning "Non Lethal Concepts of Operation," stated that: 
Non lethal technologies do not appear to be merely tactical tools with limited utility; 
rather, they appear to be strategic and operational level technologies which give us 
powerful new concepts of operation which can allow us to achieve political and mili-
tary objectives in ways not previously possible.4 
Russian military experts, whose Soviet predecessors were the first to recognize the 
military technical revolution (MTR) or what in the West is called the revolution in military 
affairs (RMA), also "view nontraditional weapons a~ the next stage in the ongoing MTR. 
They continue to examine the roles of air-, sea-, and space-based directed-energy weap-
ons, as well as the role of systems termed nonlethal in the West. "5 
It is this potential that nonlethal technologies offer, how they will influence the American 
use of politico-military force in the 21st century, the policy surrounding the use of this 
force, and the fundamental concerns that such a trend projection raises that will be dis-
cussed in this essay. 
Trend Projection 
The incorporation of nonlethal technologies by our armed services is envisioned to 
result in the development of dual-capability lethal- and nonlethal-based warfare during 
the transition period to Fourth Epoch War.6 The basic principle behind the epochs of war 
is the profound impact the energy foundations ofWestem civilization have exerted on its 
military and social organization. The First Epoch was based on human energy, the Sec-
ond Epoch on animal energy and the Third Epoch on mechanical energy. The emerging 
Fourth Epoch will be based upon a postmechanical energy foundation. 
While the three earlier epochs were based solely upon the use of lethal force, the 
emerging Fourth Epoch will see an expansion of the concept of coercive force. The 
nonlethal capabi lity which is now developing will continue to grow in importance until it 
surpasses lethality-based warfare as the preferred means of conducting war in the West. 
This will take place because the politico-military value of this emerging nonlethal force 
capability will ultimately be viewed in the decades to come as superior to a lethal capabil-
ity toward the furtherance of national security policy for three primary reasons: 
Fewer political objections result from the application of nonlethal force as opposed to 
the application oflethal force. 7 
• Disabling an opponent is more efficient than killing an opponent. 
Precision over politico-military force application allows an entire spectrum of re-
sponses which can be brought to bear in a conflict scenario. 
The first point is a by-product of the global news media broadcast trend, the "CNN 
effect," which has developed.8 It represents a major component in the shift in American 
society which has resulted in a public no longer willing to accept the loss of American 
lives, or for that matter the lives of indigenous peoples, in foreign military operations 
except in "just war" circumstances.9 
Domestically, many of our American city cores are beginning to resemble Third World 
environments where the rule of law requires restoration at least periodically by force 
(e.g., the Los Angeles riots); nonlethal means will also become increasingly relied upon 
in these circumstances to help restore order. This is a trend which is intensified by the 
negative public opinion concerning the use of deadly force on American citizenry - even 
more so than on foreign populations. 
It is envisioned that this operational constraint on the use oflethal force will dominate 
politico-military concerns over the next decade or two. Ultimately, the use of nonlethal 
force to achieve national security policy goals will be viewed as superior to lethal force in 
some situations because its use will be less apt to be challenged by public opinion. This 
potentiality is actively influencing the Department of Defense which, under the lead of 
Charles F. Swett, Assistant for Strategic Assessment, is currently in the process of for-
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mulating "policies and procedures governing the role of nonlethal weapons in U.S. na-
tional security, their acquisition, and employment." 10 The working defmition of these 
weapons is as follows: 
Non-lethal weapons are discriminate weapons that are explicitly designed and em-
ployed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities and 
undesired damage to property and the environment. 
Unlike weapons that permanently destroy targets through blast, fragmentation or pen-
etration, nonlethal weapons have relatively reversible effects on targets and/or are 
able to discriminate between targets and non-targets in the weapon' s area of impact. 11 
This emerging policy will probably explicitly ban funding for nonlethal weapons which 
do not satisfy a number of criteria. The most relevant of these criteria, for our purposes, 
is the one requiring nonlethal weaponry to "have an acceptably low probability of being 
fatal or inflicting permanent disablement on personnel, and causing undesired damage to 
property and the environment."12 
The second of the three points may become even more important than the first within 
the very near future. It is based on the idea that the long-term disablement of an opponent 
is far more efficient than the killing of an opponent. Disablement creates a greater burden 
(economic, social, psychological, political, etc.) on the opposing political grouping (na-
tion-state, subnational group, mob, etc.) than does the death of one of its members. 
Such a perception is at odds with modem Western ideas governing the conduct of 
war (e.g., the Department of Defense policy draft on nonlethal weapons) and current 
arms control treaties. Soviet military experts who have analyzed the role of advanced 
technologies in the GulfWar as a prototype of future war, however, have already reached 
the conclusion that "the GulfW ar demonstrated that a qualitative future has replaced the 
quantitative past of warfare. And the heart of current arms control treaties is said to 
belong to that past." 13 Because the potential that new technologies offer is not being 
constrained by old ideas governing their use in the Russian successor state, and undoubt-
edly in many non-Western states and subnational groups who do not share current West-
em moral inhibitions, we have decided to give serious consideration to this politico-mili-
tary force path in our trend projection. 
The third and final point is based on the great utility offered by the tailored application 
of political violence. Killing, as previously mentioned, is not always the most efficient 
application of coercive force. Based on the differing needs of military (foreign) and 
police (domestic) force requirements, it is thought that two divergent, yet integrated, 
threads of nonlethal weaponry will develop: 
• short-term incapacitation (physical-mentaVperceptual disruption); 
• long-term incapacitation (physical-mental/perceptual disruption). 
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These threads will be combined with current lethal technology, and future advances in 
that area, to provide three levels of politico-military force options available to American 
decision-makers in the 21st century where only a lethal option existed before. Further, 
these politico-military force options will be applied against both the physical and mental/ 
perceptual attributes of human and machine targets. (See matrix 1.)14 
These future force options will significantly influence the development offorce XXI 
operational concepts. As a result, radically new post-Clausewitzian concepts of politico-
military force application will begin to develop because, when what before appeared as 
discrete and unrelated forms of warfare (e.g., information/electronic warfare, chemical 
warfare, biological warfare, propaganda warfare) and advanced technologies (e.g., di-
rected energy, acoustic projection, computer viruses, genetic engineering) are taken to-
gether, they yield a coherent vision of future warfare which has no parallel in the past. 
Matrix 1 
21st Century Politico-Military Force Spectrum 
FORCE HUMAN HUMAN MACHINE MACHINE 
(Physical) (Mental/ (Hardware) (Software) 
Perceptual) 
Short-term • Bean Bag • Directed • Antitraction • Frequency 
Incapacitation • Infrasonic Light • Carbon Fibers Jammer 
• Rubber • Hydrogen • Sticky Net • Low Voltage 
Bullet Sulphide Gas • Super-adhesive • Multitasking 
• Sponge • Pheromonal Virus 
Grenade • Strobe Light 
• Taser 
• Tear Gas 
Long-term • Acoustic • Behavior- • Acetylene • Computer 
Incapacitation • Laser Altering Drugs Bubbles Virus 
• Microwave • Genetic • Anti-Material Weapon 
• Mustard Gas Alteration Corrosive • High 
• Radiological • Neuro- • Anti-Plastic Voltage Pulse 
Implant Microbes • Sleeper 
• Propaganda • Polystyrene Virus 
Pellets 
Deadly • Artillery • Death • Armor Piercing • Nonnuclear 
Barrage Hologram • High Explosive Electro-
• Rifle • Hyper Sleep Antitank magnetic 
Round Deprivation Pulse 
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Two general observations can be made concerning these politico-military force op-
tions. Against an advanced technology opponent, nonlethal technology applied against 
machines (specifically information machines) will probably dominate. 15 This fact already 
appears well known to subnationals hostile to the West given the high numbers of com-
puter viruses which originate in the Middle East and on the Indian subcontinent. For this 
reason, the Pearl Harbors of the 21st century will probably occur in cyberspace (e.g., on 
the Internet or in the fmancial records of a major bank) and can as easily be initiated by a 
drug cartel against a nation-state as by one nation-state against another. 
Against a non-Western opponent lacking advanced technology, such aS' a local war-
lord, nonlethal technology applied against humans will presumably dominate. In the 
evacuation of United Nations forces in Somalia in late February 1995, U.S. Marines 
brought with them rubber bullets, bean-bag shotguns and two kinds of sticky foam. While 
only sticky foam was used to cover the fmal withdrawal, its deployment was a watershed 
event, one which signifies a future dominant component in U.S. politico-military force 
application in less developed countries. Further, many of these countries are becoming 
increasingly urbanized and therefore pose extremely restrictive future battlefield environ-
ments for Army soldiers. Not surprisingly, given the striking combat environment paral-
lels, the origins of much of this technology can be directly linked to the Vietnam era when 
it was developed for antipersonnel weapons. 16 
Having made these general observations, the three types offorce which will exist in 
the 21st century will be addressed. Their application against humans rather than against 
machines will be the focus, however, because of the greater ethical implications that will 
develop. Although short-term incapacitation has both domestic and foreign application, 
it is its domestic application by police forces that will conceivably dominate for quite 
some time. In use on American citizens, the short-term incapacitation this form of nonle-
thal technology allows is exactly what is required in riot and crowd control scenarios. 17 
Long-term incapacitation would result in citizens who become an economic and po-
litical burden on our polity - an undesirable end- and the antithesis of what our nation 
stands for. This form offorce also has immense utility in foreign engagements, perhaps 
predominantly so in the next couple of decades. Peacekeeping operations will continue to 
be required, as will warnings to hostile polities threatening greater use of force unless 
American policy dictates are complied with. 18 An example of the application of this last 
form of force might be delivering of acetylene bubbles or solvent pellets via cruise missile 
or artillery delivery systems, thus rendering the internal combustion engines of a tank 
column of a hostile nation inert at the border of the country it is intent on seizing. 19 
Additionally, long-term incapacitation technology would be used against certain hos-
tile forces abroad because it creates a burden for the opposing polity far out of proportion 
to that of the use oflethal force. It is commonly accepted on the battlefield that nonlethal 
casualties remove multiple soldiers from combat and place greater strain on the 
sustainability of an armed force than do fatalities. The potential ofthis form of force is 
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apparent, however, when taken to a macro-level of abstraction, resulting from a con-
scious policy on the part ofUnited States' or other countries' armed forces to inflict long-
term incapacitating, instead of lethal, wounds on opposing combatants. 
Deadly force, the third component of the envisioned 21st century politico-military 
force spectrum, is the traditional form of force used in the Western conduct of war and in 
domestic law enforcement since no precision has existed over the control of political 
violence. In the future, when the application of nonlethal force is available but not suffi-
cient to induce compliance, lethal force will still be an option of last resort. In other 
instances, however, lethal weaponry will continue to be the initial form of force applica-
tion. A danger exists in creating the expectation of "thresholds of force" which must be 
followed because it would limit U.S. flexibility in its response to future international 
cnses. 
As a result of these politico-military developments, during the transition to Fourth 
Epoch War, dual-capability weapons (i.e. , lethal and nonlethal) will begin to be fielded as 
the West (and the United States in particular) begins to "work out" the application of 
nonlethal technology. One such prototype weapon is the Objective Individual Combat 
Weapon (OICW), the likely successor to the Ml6A2/M203 rifle/grenade launcher, which 
merges a standard 5.56mm lethal kinetic-energy round capability with a 20rnm drum 
which can be filled with either high explosive- (HE) or soft-drag grenades laden with tear 
gas (CS) or marking dye for crowd control purposes. (See figure 1.) 20 
Figure 1 
Second Generation OICW Mockup21 
1111 II I I 
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Even more advanced prototypes of these weapons are beginning to exploitnonengine-
based forms of energy. Some explanation, at this point, is required. A modem assault 
rifle is essentially an engine-based system. It mimics an engine in that each bullet repre-
sents a one-way piston which is ejected after each internal combustion takes place. For 
low-energy lasers, holographic projectors, high-power acoustics and other advanced de-
vices to be fielded, more powerful energy sources beyond engine-based forms are ulti-
mately required.22 
The movement toward nonengine-based forms is a critical development because it 
represents an integral aspect ofF ourth Epoch War theory which forecasts the future field-
ing of qualitatively advanced military weaponry as one attribute of the energy paradigm 
shift between the Modem and the Post-Modem worlds. As a result of this energy shift, 
weapons such as "brilliant laser rifles" will ultimately be fielded in the decades to come 
with variable intensity settings to allow them the capacity of being used across the po-
litico-military force spectrum. 
Fundamental Concerns 
The projected trends regarding the massive impact of nonlethal technology on the use 
of American politico-military force in the 21st century raises three fundamental concerns. 
The first concern, which deals with methodology, is that the importance of nonlethal 
technology may just be a mythical "silver bullet." Such a concern results from the revo-
lution in military affairs (RMA) having heretofore been defined solely as a "technical 
legacy" to the exclusion of other critical issues such as "purpose, strategy, doctrine, op-
erational innovation and organizational adaptation. "23 This projection, however, not only 
acknowledges the existence of such idea-based concerns, but is founded on the premise 
that ideas form half of the synthesis, along with technology, required for qualitative mili-
tary change. 24 
The three energy epochs ofWestem civilization and a fourth emerging one isolated in 
earlier work support such a premise. The First Epoch represents the Classical age when 
human energy dominated military organization, as witnessed by the development of the 
phalanx and the legion, and the economy which was based on slave-holding. The Second 
Epoch represents the Medieval world when animal energy dominated military and eco-
nomic organization. Cavalry dominated the feudal array and oxen and horses represented 
the chief motive source of an economy based on fief-holding. The Third Epoch repre-
sents the Modem world when mechanical energy based on machine, later engine forms, 
dominated military and economic organization. Varying forms of artillery (broadly de-
fined) dominated the conduct of war while mercantilism, and later capitalism, became the 
basis of economic production. The emerging Fourth Epoch represents a Post-Modem 
world based on postmechanical forms of energy, resulting in the development of qualita-
tively new forms of military, economic and social organization. 
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Each of the three earlier epochs witnessed one or more energy sequences developing. 
An energy sequence is based first on the experimental exploitation, and later institution-
alization, of a specific form of energy. The emergence of the Fourth Epoch means that an 
experimental era is now being entered. This era has great similarities to the European 
Renaissance, which is generally accepted as a period of historical transition, because it 
witnessed the emergence of the arquebus, a form of technology which also represented 
an experimental era of energy source exploitation. 
This projection recognizes that the body of competing technologies that nonlethal 
weaponry represents greatly parallels the fielding of the arquebus. Because the technol-
ogy embodied in the arquebus was so qualitatively advanced and misunderstood by the 
dominant knightly culture of the era, attempts were made to ban its introduction on the 
battlefield. Ultimately, however, the technology the arquebus introduced on the battle-
field vis-a-vis preexisting weapons 
was shown to have far wider application: that is, it displayed more promise. The 
concept of promise can be understood if we consider the decision to abandon the 
longbow and crossbow in favor of the arquebus. A comparison between the three 
would show that the longbow was a relatively easy weapon to manufacture but re-
quired extensive training in its use. The crossbow, on the other hand, was difficult to 
manufacture but easier to train a soldier to use. The arquebus combined the worst of 
both systems. It was difficult and costly to manufacture, and required a lengthy 
period of training in the complexities of its use. Yet the two forms of the bow had 
exhausted their potential; the energy they employed had reached the limit of its effi-
cient use in that form. The arquebus, primitive though it was, could be seen to have 
great developmental potential; no such potential could be envisioned for either longbow 
or crossbow. 25 
The multitude of competing nonlethal technologies which now exist are based on a 
wide range of kinetic, electric and chemical forms, according to Dr. Edward P. Scannell, 
a leading expert in this field ofstudy.26 We, however, expand this concept and take the 
position that far more nonlethal technology forms, not traditionally defmed as such by the 
military services, exist. These include, but are not limited to, propaganda/psychological, 
informational and biotechnological forms usually considered to provide the basis for other 
separate and distinct types of warfare. (Refer back to matrix 1.) 
This proliferation of nonlethal weaponry, also qualitatively advanced and misunder-
stood by the dominant military culture of our era, has parallels in the earlier epochal shift 
(between energy paradigms) which took place between the Second and Third epochs. 
The European conduct ofwar during the centuries prior to 1500 was fragmented in na-
ture because it reflected the regional forms of warfare that bad developed. These local 
forms of warfare exploited competing forms of mechanical-based weaponry and compet-
ing ideas concerning how they should be fielded. It was not until the stunning French 
invasion ofltaly in 1494 under Charles VIII's army which "mixed these weapon systems 
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and tactical perspectives" that a Europe-wide form of warfare began to developY Be-
cause of the significant historical precedents, we are confident that the projection con-
cerning the profound importance of nonlethal technology is reasonably accurate. In fact, 
it can be said that the introduction of nonlethal technology on the battlefield will be as 
significant as the introduction of gunpowder during the European Renaissance. 
The second fundamental concern focuses on the synergistic effect resulting from the 
interaction of nonlethal technology, recognized as only one developmental thread of ad-
vanced technology warfare, with other emerging future trends. The parable of the blind 
men and the elephant is a useful conceptual tool to introduce at this point. Many military 
and academic scholars are now engaged in defining what the RMA "elephant" will look 
like when it matures. Like the blind men of the parable, each scholar seems, in general, 
able to focus on only one major aspect of this as yet unrecognizable creature. Arquilla 
and Ronfeldt (Cyber War), the Tofflers (Third Wave War), de Caro (Soft War) and others 
focus on the information/electronic aspect of the RMA.28 Metz and Kievit argue that the 
biotechnological aspects of this creature "including genetic engineering and advanced 
behavior-altering drugs" may potentially be more profound.29 De Landa (Robots) and 
Anderberg and Wolbarsht (Lasers) focus on still other aspects of the RMA.30 To add to 
this confusion, Lind et al. (Fourth Generation Warfare), van Creveld (Non-Trinitarian 
War) and Huntington (Cultural War) focus on the rise of very credible non-Western threats 
which can be likened to an anti-RMA "mouse."31 
Information/electronic, biotechnology and robotic developments will have profound 
nonlethal politico-military force applications.32 Less exotic applications such as com-
puter viruses, electronic jamming operations, media broadcasts and carbon fiber-filled 
Tomahawk missiles (launched against Iraqi power plants during the Gulf War) have al-
ready been recognized. 33 More esoteric applications could include the deployment of 
static and mobile machine soldiers which dispense sleeping gasses for crowd control 
purposes, nonnuclear electromagnetic pulse (NNEMP) generators or Co I. Warden's en-
visioned "holographic prophet" projected over a hostile capital whose radio and televi-
sion broadcasts have been seized and are being used against it. 34 
The value of recognizing the contribution each group of scholars provides concerning 
this "elephant" and its "mouse" sidekick is apparent. The advanced technology thread 
spotlighted in this essay will impact these other trends while at the same time being 
influenced by them. The approach we have taken is to focus on a broader and more 
inclusive framework that accounts for both of these creatures within our energy based 
paradigm. 
We argue further that the foci of the various scholars can be seen as reflecting the 
simultaneous nonlinear generation of attributes of epochal change between the Modern 
and Post -Modern worlds in the same manner as that which took place during the Western 
Renaissance five centuries ago. This is a perception currently held by relatively few 
American strategic thinkers because most primarily focus only on narrow military and 
geopolitical concerns. 
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The final fundamental concern raised by our projection entails the impact the incor-
poration of nonlethal technology will ultimately have on American political and military 
institutions - though this concern should be broadened to include the incorporation of all 
forms of advanced technology embodied in the RMA. 
It is generally recognized that between approximately 1815 and 1830, Western his-
torical patterns became compressed with the advent of industrialization. This has re-
sulted in subepochal change (or change which takes place in an energy paradigm), which 
once took centuries to occur, now taking a little more than a century to be completed. 35 
This increasing rate of change and the fact that an epochal, rather than subepochal, shift is 
taking place, increases the probability of a new national security dilemma emerging from 
our nation's relationship with advanced technology. This relationship is similar to that of 
humanity toward Pandora's box- a box full of unwanted evils and hope. This is not a 
Luddite perception but one gained from an intimate appreciation of Western historical 
and political development.36 
Additionally, the future incorporation by our nation of the politico-military force spec-
trum envisioned in this essay will have important and unexpected consequences. Recent 
events provide early warnings for this concern. In military operations in Somalia and 
Haiti where CS and pepper spray, representing short-term incapacitants, were carried by 
individual soldiers, the authorization for the use of this nonlethal force had to be obtained 
at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hence, the use of nonlethal force and what it 
represents, both socially and politically, is already clashing with traditional ideas on how 
to conduct modern military operations. Our military rules of engagement (ROE) are 
becoming increasingly irrelevant to the new capabilities even these primitive forms of 
nonlethal technology are posing. 
Concerns over the influence the introduction of nonlethal technology will have on 
lowering the threshold for the use of military power, on redefining an act of war and on 
eroding soldier combat skills have also been expressed by some scholars. War may no 
longer seem so repulsive as it once was and therefore we may rely upon it more often in 
the pursuit of national objectives - much as we did initially in the Civil War and Vietnam 
because we thought each conflict would be short and neat. Furthermore, defining an act 
of war now becomes problematic. 37 Would a highly effective propaganda attack against 
an opposing polity now be grounds for launching an overt military strike? 
It is also envisioned that extensive reliance on nonlethal weaponry to incapacitate 
enemies will have an unfortunate side effect of making it extremely difficult for our troops 
to kill, even when their lives depend on it. It has been estimated that about six months of 
training may be required to properly resocialize many troops into the act of killing after 
relying on nonlethal weapons for prolonged periods of time. 38 
The implications of a conscious decision, which could come about unilaterally or far 
more likely as a reaction to the policy of a hostile power, to inflict long-term incapacita-
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tion by U.S. forces on opposing combatants can thus be imagined. The problem concern-
ing the ethics of employment will again arise. This time, however, nonlethal technology 
may wel1 be considered inhurnane.39 Many, in fact, may argue that it is more humane to 
kill opposing soldiers than to purposefully implement a defense policy which seeks to 
permanently blind them, disrupt their nervous systems or severely degrade their lung 
capacity, while others will argue that it is better to have lost sight or lung capacity than to 
be dead.40 References to the horrors of the gassings of the First World War will undoubt-
edly be made. Furthermore, the potential for a new form of martyrdom based on those 
living, not dead, wi!l arise. 
This and other dilemmas will undoubtedly be compounded as the capacity to employ 
such nonlethal force on the battlefield becomes increasingly more precise over the de-
cades to come with the deepening mastery of America's armed forces over the conduct of 
war. The capacity to precisely inflict long-term incapacitating disabilities will likely cre-
ate an intense debate within our armed forces, and the nation that it mirrors, regarding the 
accepted norms of conducting modern warfare.4 1 Such a debate will center on the ques-
tion of whether a democratic society should be allowed to wage war in this fashion. 
The effects of this one moral dilemma will be magnified if just a few other advanced 
technology developments take place. Such developments under consideration include 
the fielding of early robotic systems which are unable to take prisoners, the wearing of 
battle suits which automatically inject severely wounded soldiers with adrenal hormones 
and pain-suppressers to keep them in combat, and the battlefield harvesting of the organs 
of fallen soldiers to save the lives of their comrades. Clearly, if enough events following 
this pattern take place too rapidly, our political and military institutions have the potential 
to become overwhelmed by the ethical dilemmas that will ensue.42 
Conclusion 
From this nonlethal technology trend projection, including the development of the 
21 st century politico-military force spectrum capability it provides, the policy questions 
surrounding its use and the fundamental concerns this has spawned, it is argued that at 
least two things need to occur. The first is that the revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
debate within the Army needs to be broadened to incorporate a political dimension. Pe-
riods of massive military change, such as we are now entering, do not take place in a 
political vacuum and for that reason the concept of a "revolution in political and military 
affairs" (RPMA) needs to be developed.43 To continue this debate only within military 
parameters will result in both a myopic and inaccurate vision of the future, one which 
ignores the true magnitude of the changes now occurring in our economic and societal 
structures, and may lead to alienation from the broader political process and the Ameri-
canpeople. 
The second is that the Army is going to have to rise above the intense rivalries that are 
a function of defense reductions and the current roles and missions debate. As the recog-
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nized leader of future warfighting doctrinal innovation and institutional adaptation, it must 
take the lead with government, industry and the other armed services in a new and critical 
venture. This undertaking must ensure that the cutting-edge technology that is currently 
being developed for military purposes, much of which is now in fact derived from com-
mercial industry, does not unintentionally compromise national security by being too ad-
vanced for our society in general, and political and military institutions in particular, to 
accommodate. 
Our nation is built upon an interwoven matrix of technology and ideas. The potential 
exists for this synthesis to be irrevocably shattered by the introduction of qualitatively 
advanced military technology. Historical precedents exist as a basis for such concerns.44 
Our government, therefore, must proceed with absolute caution when negotiating the 
uncertain path we have begun. To do this, a nonpartisan governmental body must be 
assembled whose function is to develop a coherent and comprehensive policy concerning 
the introduction of advanced technology into our armed forces so that our national institu-
tions do not become destabilized, while allowing our military forces to retain their techni-
cal warfighting edge. 
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